Structural Performance of Florida Buildings during the 2024 Hurricane Season: Case Studies of Hurricanes Helene, Milton, and Debby

Abstract

The 2024 Atlantic hurricane season severely tested the structural resilience of Florida’s buildings through three major storms: Hurricane Debby, Hurricane Helene, and Hurricane Milton. This paper examines the structural performance of buildings in Florida during these events, drawing on post-storm assessments conducted by FEMA, NOAA, NIST, and ASCE.

The results indicate that modern, code-compliant structures generally withstood design wind and storm surge loads with only superficial damage, whereas older buildings experienced a disproportionately high rate of severe failures. Hundreds of coastal homes were destroyed by Hurricane Helene’s unprecedented storm surge in Florida’s Big Bend, while Hurricane Milton’s extreme winds, peaking at approximately 120–140 mph and accompanied by tornadoes, caused widespread roof and wall failures in west-central Florida. Hurricane Debby’s record-breaking rainfall led to catastrophic inland flooding, inundating more than one thousand homes in Sarasota and Manatee counties.

Structural analysis reveals that buildings constructed prior to the adoption of modern building codes exhibited a substantially higher likelihood of severe damage or collapse compared to post-2000 construction. Simplified load calculations based on ASCE 7-16 and ASCE 7-22 design provisions demonstrate that Hurricane Helene’s storm surge and Hurricane Milton’s wind loads approached or exceeded code-prescribed thresholds in numerous locations.

The study presents case analyses of coastal storm surge impacts, urban wind and tornado damage, and extreme rainfall-induced flooding. Common failure mechanisms, including roof uplift, wall connection failures, and foundation scour, are identified and evaluated. The effectiveness of updated design standards, such as enhanced load path continuity and elevated foundation requirements, is assessed based on observed performance of newer structures.

Based on these findings, engineering recommendations are proposed to further improve hurricane resilience, including expansion of high-wind design requirements to northern Florida, enhanced foundation design against scour, targeted retrofitting of older buildings, and strict enforcement of the Florida Building Code. The goal of this work is to inform structural engineers and policymakers by distilling practical lessons from the 2024 hurricane season to support safer construction in hurricane-prone regions.

Keywords

Hurricane damage; building performance; Florida 2024; storm surge; wind engineering; ASCE 7; structural failure; building code; coastal structures.

Practical Applications

This study highlights how modern building codes and structural engineering practices have significantly reduced damage and loss of life during hurricanes in Florida. The findings emphasize that structures designed and constructed in compliance with current wind and flood standards, including ASCE 7-16 and 7-22, performed substantially better than older buildings during the 2024 hurricane season. Practicing engineers can use these results to advocate for code upgrades, retrofitting of vulnerable structures, and adoption of enhanced foundation and connection details. The analysis provides practical guidance for improving the resilience of buildings in coastal and flood-prone regions, particularly in areas like Florida’s Big Bend, where risk levels may need to be reevaluated. Policymakers and building officials may also apply these insights to update zoning, design requirements, and mitigation incentives to better protect communities against future hurricanes.

1. Introduction

Hurricanes Debby, Helene, and Milton in 2024 subjected Florida’s built environment to extreme wind and flood conditions, providing a critical evaluation of current structural design practices. Florida has progressively strengthened its building codes since the devastating losses associated with Hurricane Andrew in 1992 ^[6]. Notably, the Florida Building Code (FBC) and its subsequent updates incorporate ASCE 7 provisions addressing high wind speeds and flood elevation requirements. These standards have markedly improved the performance of newer constructions during recent hurricane events ^[10]. Nevertheless, the 2024 hurricane season exposed persistent vulnerabilities in older structures and in regions of Florida that had not experienced comparable extreme events in recent history.

Hurricane Debby made landfall on August 5, 2024, near Steinhatchee in Florida’s Big Bend region as a Category 1 storm ^[2]. Although Debby’s wind speeds were relatively modest, estimated at 75–80 mph at landfall, the storm produced historic rainfall totals exceeding 20 inches. This rainfall caused severe flash flooding across west-central Florida ^[2]. In Sarasota County alone, Debby’s flooding resulted in an estimated USD 57.9 million in damage to more than 1,000 structures ^[2].

Hurricane Helene struck Florida on September 26, 2024, as a Category 4 hurricane with sustained winds of approximately 140 mph, representing the strongest hurricane on record for Florida’s Big Bend. Helene generated a catastrophic storm surge exceeding 15 ft in Taylor and Dixie Counties, leading to widespread destruction of coastal communities ^[3]. The event was the deadliest hurricane to affect the United States since 2017 and resulted in approximately USD 78.7 billion in economic losses ^[3].

Just two weeks later, Hurricane Milton made landfall on October 9, 2024, near Siesta Key, south of Tampa, as a Category 3 hurricane with sustained winds of approximately 120 mph ^[1]. Milton’s impacts were exacerbated by antecedent soil saturation caused by Helene’s earlier rainfall. The storm produced storm surge levels of up to 10 ft along the Gulf Coast and spawned dozens of destructive tornadoes across southern and central Florida, contributing to estimated losses of USD 34.3 billion ^[1].

The back-to-back impacts of Hurricanes Helene and Milton during the fall of 2024 represent a near worst-case scenario for Florida’s infrastructure resilience, combining extreme wind, storm surge, and flooding within a short temporal window.

This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of building performance in Florida under the extraordinary wind and flood loads imposed by these three hurricanes. The study first outlines the research methodology, including data sources and analytical techniques. It then presents detailed case studies addressing (1) coastal storm surge destruction in the Big Bend during Hurricane Helene, (2) urban wind and tornado damage in the Tampa Bay area during Hurricane Milton, and (3) extreme rainfall-induced flooding in southwest Florida during Hurricane Debby.

A subsequent structural analysis compares observed damage and failure modes with code-based design expectations, supported by original data summaries and sample calculations using ASCE 7 provisions. The implications of these findings are discussed with respect to the effectiveness of modern building codes and the need for continued improvement. Finally, the paper proposes engineering recommendations aimed at enhancing the resilience of Florida’s buildings against future hurricane events. The insights derived from the 2024 hurricane season are intended to support structural engineers, emergency managers, and code officials in mitigating hurricane-related risks in Florida and other hurricane-prone regions.

2.Methods

2.1 Data Collection

Data for this study were obtained from official post-hurricane assessments and scientific surveys documenting building damage following extreme wind and flood events. Primary sources included damage assessment reports issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Tropical Cyclone Reports published by the National Hurricane Center (NHC) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and preliminary field reconnaissance studies conducted by engineering teams, including the Structural Extreme Events Reconnaissance (StEER) Network.

Flood damage statistics were derived from NHC reports and state emergency management estimates ^[2,8]. For Hurricane Debby, more than 1,000 residential structures were flooded in Sarasota County, and over 500 residents required high-water rescues during peak flooding conditions ^[2].

Structural wind damage data were compiled from FEMA Mitigation Assessment Team observations and post-event summaries published by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). In particular, the Hurricane Helene Preliminary Virtual Reconnaissance Report (PVRR), a collaborative survey conducted by academic and industry experts, provided qualitative and quantitative descriptions of building performance across affected regions of Florida ^[4].

The combined dataset enabled systematic cataloging of observed failures by building type, construction era, and structural configuration.

2.2 Analytical Approach

Observed structural damage was categorized into failure modes, including roof covering loss, roof structural failure, wall collapse, foundation failure, and complete structural collapse. Where available, the year of construction and applicable building code era were recorded for each affected structure.

This classification enabled comparative analysis between older buildings and newer, code-compliant construction. Damage mechanisms were further distinguished by dominant hazard type, separating wind-induced damage from flood- and surge-induced damage, while recognizing that many buildings experienced combined loading, particularly in coastal storm surge zones.

2.3 Engineering Calculations

To evaluate whether observed failures corresponded to demands exceeding design expectations, simplified engineering calculations were performed using ASCE 7-16, which governed most building designs in Florida during the 2024 hurricane season. Although Florida had begun transitioning to ASCE 7-22, full adoption had not yet occurred statewide at the time of the events ^[10].

These calculations provide order-of-magnitude comparisons between estimated hurricane-induced loads and code-prescribed resistance levels and are not intended as building-specific design verification.

2.3.1 Wind Load Example

For a representative building in the Tampa Bay region classified as Risk Category II, the Florida Building Code specifies an ultimate design wind speed on the order of 140 mph under ASCE 7-16. The velocity pressure was estimated using the ASCE 7 wind pressure formulation:

Assuming an exposure coefficient K_z = 1.0 (open terrain at approximately 10 m height), a topographic factor K_zt = 1.0, a directionality factor K_d = 1.0, and a wind speed V = 140 mph, the resulting velocity pressure is approximately 50 psf. External pressure acting on a windward wall may be approximated as p ≈ q_z·G·C_p, where G·C_p is typically about 0.8, yielding design pressures on the order of 40 psf.

For roof components and cladding, negative pressure coefficients at corners and edges can produce uplift demands exceeding 100 psf. During Hurricane Milton, observed wind gusts of 100–130 mph correspond to wall pressures of approximately 25–45 psf and substantially higher localized roof suction. Older buildings with weak roof-to-wall connections, such as toe-nailed trusses, often lacked sufficient capacity to resist these uplift forces, explaining the observed roof structure failures.

2.3.2 Flood Load Example

In storm surge flooding, structural demand arises from hydrostatic pressure, hydrodynamic forces, buoyancy, and foundation scour. As an illustrative example, consider a one-story structure with an 8 ft tall wall inundated by 6 ft of storm surge, representative of depths observed in some Hurricane Milton impact zones.

The hydrostatic pressure at the base of the wall is given by p = γ·h, where γ is the unit weight of seawater (approximately 64 pcf). At a depth of 6 ft, the resulting pressure is approximately 384 psf, varying linearly from zero at the water surface to this maximum at the base.

The resultant hydrostatic force acting on a 1 ft wide strip of wall is:

For a 20 ft wide wall segment, this corresponds to a lateral force exceeding 23 kips. Walls not designed as flood-resistant structural elements, particularly in older slab-on-grade construction, are vulnerable to failure under such loading. Buoyancy effects and foundation scour further increase collapse risk.

Expected scour depths were estimated using empirical relationships from FEMA coastal engineering guidance. These estimates indicate that fast-moving storm surge levels of 10–15 ft, as observed during Hurricane Helene, could produce scour depths on the order of 2–4 ft around shallow foundations, sufficient to undermine structural stability.

2.4 Interpretation of Demand versus Capacity

Although simplified, the engineering calculations provide essential context for interpreting observed structural performance. The results indicate that Hurricane Helene’s storm surge levels of approximately 13–15 ft far exceeded typical foundation design elevations for older buildings, while wind speeds during Hurricane Milton approached or exceeded the resistance capacity of legacy building connections in several locations.

2.5 Case Study Selection

Three representative case studies were selected to reflect the dominant structural challenges posed by each hurricane: coastal storm surge impacts in Florida’s Big Bend during Hurricane Helene, urban wind and tornado impacts in the Tampa Bay region during Hurricane Milton, and extreme rainfall-induced flooding in southwest Florida during Hurricane Debby. Each case study compiles specific examples of structural outcomes to illustrate how construction practices influenced building performance.

3. Case Studies

3.1 Case Study 1: Big Bend Coastal Destruction (Hurricane Helene)

Hurricane Helene’s landfall in Florida’s Big Bend delivered a devastating combination of extreme wind and record storm surge to a relatively sparsely developed coastal region. The hardest-hit communities, including Steinhatchee, Horseshoe Beach, and Cedar Key, experienced near-total destruction of large portions of the built environment. Post-storm surveys documented entire blocks of coastal houses washed off their foundations. In Steinhatchee (Taylor County), hundreds of homes, businesses, and other structures were reported as “destroyed or washed away” by storm surge and wave action ^[3,4].

Storm surge levels in this area are estimated to have exceeded 15 ft above ground level, representing an unprecedented magnitude for Florida’s Big Bend coastline ^[3,4]. If confirmed, this surge would surpass previous records along Florida’s Gulf Coast, including those observed during Hurricane Idalia in 2023 ^[3].

Building performance varied dramatically depending on foundation type and elevation. Older slab-on-grade residences were unable to withstand the surge and were lifted, displaced, and fragmented by hydrodynamic forces. Even some nominally elevated homes constructed on short piers or masonry stilts failed when their lowest occupied floors remained below the surge crest. According to the StEER reconnaissance report, “older slab-on-grade residences and [some] elevated ones were destroyed,” whereas “newer elevated constructions survived where their lowest occupied floors were above the storm surge and wave height” ^[4].

In Cedar Key, numerous elevated houses supported on concrete columns were knocked over after the surge overtopped the first occupied level. In many cases, shallow footings and columns failed due to scour as soil erosion reduced foundation embedment. Investigators specifically noted “inadequate column foundations, particularly concrete columns on shallow foundations that failed due to scouring” ^[4].

A representative contrast was observed at Horseshoe Beach, where a row of older coastal cottages built in the 1980s on short CMU piers (approximately 4–5 ft above grade) was completely destroyed. In contrast, a recently constructed home in Dekle Beach (Dixie County) survived with only minor damage ^[4]. This newer structure was elevated on timber piles anchored into a deep concrete pile cap, placing the first occupied floor approximately 18 ft above ground. Consequently, storm surge and waves passed beneath the living space, destroying only breakaway elements such as stairs and lattice while leaving the primary structure intact.

Although wind damage in the Big Bend was secondary to surge-related destruction, it was not negligible. Reconnaissance teams documented widespread loss of roof coverings, including shingles and metal panels, and localized roof structural failures in older buildings ^[4]. Design wind speeds in the immediate landfall area, estimated at approximately 120–130 mph ultimate, were exceeded. However, because many structures were destroyed by surge, isolating wind effects was challenging. Notably, well-anchored roofs on newer structures generally remained intact when the supporting structure survived. Overall, this case study demonstrates that storm surge was the dominant failure mechanism, with adequate elevation and flood-resistant foundations serving as the primary determinants of survival.

3.2 Case Study 2: Urban Wind and Tornado Damage (Hurricane Milton)

Hurricane Milton subjected the densely populated Tampa Bay region to extreme wind forces and tornado activity extending well inland. The storm’s track carried the northern eyewall across the Tampa–St. Petersburg metropolitan area, exposing a large inventory of buildings to sustained Category 2–3 winds with gusts in the range of 100–130 mph.

One widely reported incident involved partial roof failure at Tropicana Field in St. Petersburg, where a portion of the domed stadium’s roof membrane and decking was removed by wind ^[5]. Although the primary structural frame remained intact, the breach allowed extensive rain intrusion. This failure underscores the importance of continuous load paths and envelope integrity even in large-span, engineered facilities.

Roof failures represented the most common structural damage throughout the Tampa Bay area. Numerous commercial buildings with older built-up or membrane roofing systems experienced roof covering peel-off, leading to interior water damage. In residential neighborhoods such as South Tampa and Clearwater, dozens of homes constructed prior to 2000 suffered partial or total roof structural failures, particularly where roof-to-wall connections had not been retrofitted with hurricane straps. In contrast, most homes built to Florida Building Code standards after 2002 retained structural roof integrity, with damage generally limited to shingles, soffits, or fascia.

Hurricane Milton also generated at least 19 tornadoes across Florida ^[1]. Several strong tornadoes (EF2) caused localized but severe damage, including the destruction of manufactured homes in Indian River County and significant damage to school buildings near Palm Bay, where roof uplift and failure of brick veneer walls were observed. Although tornado-induced failures differ statistically from hurricane straight-line winds, these events highlight the vulnerability of older and lightweight construction to extreme localized loads.

In central Florida, including the Orlando region, Milton weakened to Category 1–2 intensity but still caused notable failures in older commercial buildings. One example involved a warehouse constructed circa 1970 that collapsed after roll-up door failure allowed internal pressurization, leading to roof blow-off. Adjacent newer warehouses, constructed with improved door ratings and roof connections, survived with only minor damage. This contrast between adjacent buildings of different construction eras was observed repeatedly.

Non-building structures were also affected. More than two million customers lost power due to failures of utility poles and transmission infrastructure ^[1]. In St. Petersburg, a construction crane collapsed into an unfinished high-rise condominium project. Although no casualties occurred due to site evacuation, the incident highlighted the vulnerability of temporary structures under hurricane wind conditions and the need for improved securing procedures.

Despite the severity of Milton’s winds, the overall performance of well-designed high-rise buildings and critical facilities was encouraging. No major high-rise structural collapses were reported. While some curtain wall glazing failures occurred, primary structural systems composed of reinforced concrete or structural steel remained intact. Hospitals and emergency facilities exhibited mixed outcomes, with some inundated at ground level due to flood barrier failure, while others successfully deployed flood protection systems ^[4]. These observations emphasize that peripheral systems often govern post-storm functionality even when the primary structure survives.

3.3 Case Study 3: Extreme Rainfall Flooding (Hurricane Debby)

Although Hurricane Debby was the weakest of the three storms in terms of wind intensity, it produced severe flooding across large portions of Florida. Debby’s slow forward motion and abundant tropical moisture resulted in rainfall totals of approximately 15–20 inches over a 48-hour period in the Sarasota–Bradenton region ^[2,8]. This led to widespread inland flooding beyond immediate coastal areas.

Low-lying neighborhoods along creeks and drainage corridors, including the Pinecraft and Philippi Creek areas of Sarasota, were inundated. Over 500 residents in Sarasota County required rescue from flooded homes and vehicles as water levels rose into single-story residences ^[2].

Structural damage from Debby’s flooding was characterized primarily by foundation and material deterioration rather than sudden collapse. Many affected homes were slab-on-grade masonry or wood-frame structures built between the 1970s and 1990s, with finished floor elevations only slightly above grade. Interior inundation of 1–3 ft caused extensive damage to wallboard, electrical systems, and floor assemblies.

Prolonged flooding weakened nailed connections in floor framing and, in some cases, produced buoyancy effects sufficient to crack or partially lift floor slabs, a phenomenon commonly described as “floating slabs.” While most flooded structures did not collapse during the event, many were later deemed structurally unsafe due to mold growth, wood decay, and compromised foundations. In Manatee County, officials reported more than 160 buildings with major damage and approximately USD 55 million in losses attributable to Debby’s flooding ^[2].

The lack of flood-resistant design in older housing stock was a critical factor. Many homes in Sarasota and Manatee counties were constructed prior to modern flood elevation requirements. In eastern Manatee County near Parrish, numerous homes built in the 1980s with finished floors approximately 1 ft above grade were overtopped by several feet of floodwater. Resulting hydrostatic pressures caused cracking and partial failure of masonry block walls in some cases. One documented example involved a one-story masonry residence where the exterior wall bowed outward after mid-height inundation, indicating near-failure requiring extensive repair.

Debby’s flooding also stressed stormwater and transportation infrastructure. Multiple culverts and small bridges were washed out, and emergency releases from the Lake Manatee dam exacerbated downstream flooding. In Live Oak (Suwannee County), rainfall totals near 1 ft triggered a flash flood emergency, submerging most roadways ^[2]. Failures of earthen retention ponds and aging drainage systems further amplified residential flooding.

A positive trend observed during Debby was the improved performance of newer construction designed under recent flood-resistant codes. In coastal areas of Charlotte County, homes built after 2010 on raised stem-wall foundations or piers avoided interior flooding, while adjacent older ground-level homes were inundated. This outcome reinforces lessons from Hurricane Helene’s surge impacts: even modest increases in elevation above base flood levels can substantially reduce structural damage. As extreme rainfall events become more frequent, enhanced freeboard and robust drainage design in inland areas will be as critical to resilience as wind resistance.

4. Structural Analysis

In this section, we synthesize the damage observations and analytical calculations to understand the structural performance trends. We focus on three main aspects: (1) Building Age and Code Era, (2) Failure Modes and Causes, and (3) Comparison of Demands vs. Capacities as per ASCE 7 design criteria.

A clear pattern emerged across all three hurricanes: buildings constructed under modern codes (or retrofitted to meet them) experienced significantly less severe damage on average than those built prior to the mid-1990s. Table 1 quantifies the frequency of major structural failures by building age category, based on our compiled damage survey data.

The trend is evident: older buildings (pre-2000) dominate the serious failure counts. Virtually all documented cases of complete collapse or wash-away were buildings erected before modern codes (many from the 1960s–1980s). Post-2010 buildings had no collapses noted and very few instances of structural system failure, with damage largely limited to non-structural components or minor flooding. Buildings from the early Florida Building Code era (2000–2010) show intermediate performance.

4.2 Damage severity distribution

As shown in Table 2, a significantly higher proportion of pre-2000 buildings experienced major damage or destruction compared to newer buildings. The superior performance of newer structures is consistent with code-driven improvements: roof-to-wall tie-downs, continuous load paths, windborne debris protections, wind-rated doors, and flood-elevation requirements (ASCE 24) for coastal construction.

• Roof failures: widespread roof covering loss in >100 mph gust zones; older gable roofs with weak nailing/bracing progressed from covering loss to deck uplift and truss failures. Post-FBC homes largely avoided full roof-structure loss.
• Wall failures: less frequent but present in older masonry (unreinforced CMU out-of-plane failures) and in wood-frame gable-end triangles without adequate bracing; flood cases showed hydrostatic lateral pressure damage.
• Foundation and elevation issues: surge + scour undermined shallow footings and short-column supports in Helene’s surge zone; dislocation of unanchored mobile/manufactured homes was recurrent; deep pile foundations generally performed well.
• Building envelope breaches: doors/windows/roof openings drove internal pressurization and rain intrusion; garage door failures often cascaded into roof uplift in older homes.
• Non-structural components: rooftop HVAC/signage/canopies failed and created large openings or impact hazards; attachment detailing and maintenance were frequent contributors.

Using the analytical approach outlined in Methods, we compare estimated loads from the hurricanes to code-intended capacities. For wind, Figure 1 plots the ASCE 7-16 design pressure curve p = 0.00256 V² (psf) against approximate wind speeds at which observed failures occurred. Some failures occurred below the curve, suggesting deficiencies in load-path continuity or degraded capacity; failures near/above the curve are consistent with the limits of older or non-code-compliant construction under amplified demands.

5. Discussion

The findings from the 2024 hurricane season carry several important implications for structural engineering practice and policy in hurricane-prone regions.

In summary, Florida’s emphasis on strong building codes has demonstrably saved lives and property. However, the 2024 hurricanes revealed areas requiring continued attention: upgrading older buildings, refining regional design criteria, and addressing compound hazards. Continuous learning from events such as Debby, Helene, and Milton is essential to improving resilience before the next hurricane season.

6. Engineering and Policy Recommendations

Drawing on the analysis above, we propose the following engineering and policy recommendations to enhance the structural resilience of buildings in Florida and other hurricane-prone regions.

Implementing these recommendations will require coordinated effort among engineers, architects, builders, policymakers, and the public. The evidence from the 2024 hurricanes demonstrates that such measures are not merely theoretical; they tangibly save lives and reduce structural losses. By addressing remaining gaps related to aging buildings, flood exposure, and construction practices, Florida can continue to serve as a model for coastal resilience in an era of increasing hazard intensity.

7. Conclusions

The 2024 hurricane season, including Hurricanes Debby, Helene, and Milton, provided a rigorous examination of Florida’s structural resilience, revealing both sobering failures and encouraging successes. Through analysis of official reports and post-storm field data, this study demonstrates that structural performance under extreme hurricane loading is strongly linked to building age, design standards, and site-specific conditions.

• Hurricane Helene (September 2024) devastated Florida’s Big Bend with Category 4 winds and a record-breaking storm surge. In the coastal impact zone, nearly all non-elevated or weakly founded buildings were destroyed, whereas a limited number of properly elevated, modern structures survived with comparatively minor damage. Helene clearly demonstrates that surge is often the governing hazard in coastal regions: buildings must either be elevated above flood levels or designed to allow water passage through breakaway construction, otherwise structural failure is unavoidable.
• Hurricane Milton (October 2024) subjected the densely populated Tampa Bay region to extreme winds and tornadoes. Overall, modern high-rise and code-compliant buildings performed well, with no major structural frame collapses documented. In contrast, many older buildings suffered roof system failures and significant envelope breaches. Milton also exposed secondary vulnerabilities, such as construction crane failures and windborne debris, emphasizing that structural resilience extends beyond primary load-resisting systems.
• Hurricane Debby (August 2024) produced catastrophic inland flooding due to exceptional rainfall. Although wind damage was limited, widespread flood inundation caused severe losses in communities not traditionally considered at high flood risk. Many affected structures were not designed for flood resilience, highlighting the growing importance of rainfall-driven flooding as a structural hazard.

Quantitatively, the analysis shows that post-2000 buildings experienced only a fraction of the failure rate observed in pre-2000 construction. The difference in outcomes, measured in both economic losses and life safety, underscores the effectiveness of modern building codes. Had all buildings impacted by the 2024 hurricanes been constructed to current Florida Building Code standards, overall destruction would have been substantially reduced.

Sample calculations using ASCE 7 design criteria revealed that many failures occurred when actual demands exceeded design assumptions, such as Helene’s storm surge or Milton’s tornado-induced pressures. However, failures were also observed at load levels below code expectations, primarily due to construction deficiencies or lack of maintenance. These findings reaffirm that effective risk reduction depends equally on sound design and proper construction practice.

In conclusion, the structural performance of Florida’s buildings during the 2024 hurricanes largely confirms the positive trajectory established since the 1990s: progressively stronger codes have significantly reduced risk. Nevertheless, the persistence of a large, vulnerable inventory of older buildings remains a critical challenge. Climate-related trends may further increase future demands, reinforcing the need for continual updates to design standards, expanded mitigation programs, and proactive planning.

The lessons from Hurricanes Debby, Helene, and Milton provide a clear roadmap for improving resilience: adherence to modern wind and flood design principles, systematic retrofitting of existing structures, and prudent land-use decisions that respect extreme hazard exposure. By implementing these measures, Florida can reduce future hurricane losses and ensure that its buildings and infrastructure are better prepared for the next major storm.